I'd heard the “Russian perspective” on various controversial issues, but primarily in academic circles. I really didn't have contact with Russians who would promote a hardline stance on many issues, or any Russians with a supremely Cold War outlook. It's one thing to read a belief from a book or article; I've decided its quite another to hear some of those views coming out of the mouth of your professor.
One of our professors here in Moscow is clearly a product of the Cold War. He's made more than a few comments that just boggle the mind. I'll include just a few of the examples below, with some footnotes for a bit of a backgrounder.
- In a discussion of the jury system, the Professor pointed out the trials of Khordokovsky* and Politkovskya's alleged killers as examples of how the trial system has improved. He explained that all of these trials were done by an “objective” trial-by-jury, rather than just a juror, and so had been completely fair. (It would have been hard to select more controversial high-profile Russian trials ... they certainly aren't the shining examples of the legal system that I would use!)
- The professor went on a long discussion of how the USSR was really “not an aggressive power” and didn't mind non-communist states around it, or commie states that didn't follow the USSR exactly. He decided to use Tito as an example here, asserting that “Stalin didn't mind Tito” (In reality, Tito had a rather nasty split with Stalin, reportedly eventually sending the following letter: “Stop sending people to kill me! We've already captured five of them, one with a bomb and another with a rifle... If you don't stop sending killers, I'll send a very fast working one to Moscow and I won't have to send another.”)
- In response to the professor's assertion that the USSR really did not mind Soviet-sphere countries marking their own path somewhat independently of Soviet aims, one student brought up the Soviet response to the Prague Spring as a counter-example.** In answering the student's question, the professor merely said that the Soviet response was really “not that bad” -- after all, the response to changes in Hungary had been worse!
- The professor also touched upon energy issues. As you know, Russia has been considered an increasingly unreliable energy resource supplier as the country shut off pipeline supplies to Europe numerous times during 2000s, often seemingly for political reasons.*** It is true that Ukraine & Belarus have paid significantly less than Western European nations for their energy supplies from Russia – and probably should be paying market prices – but that doesn't mean Russia's sole concerns were economic. When one student pressed him a bit more on the issue, he did concede that some political factors may have been at work as well.
At times it seems as if we're simply being fed propaganda, even if that is not his intention. To a certain extent, I do believe he tries to view issues with a fresh set of eyes, but I imagine that might be difficult for someone who's been teaching in the USSR/Russia since the 1970s. After all, he witnessed the fall of the entire system that he grew up in and supported – as the historic Big Enemy to the West became the world's sole great power with that collapse. It seems that he (and likely others) feels a need to justify Russia's actions – both today and in the past. When he can't, he'll simply refuse to straightforwardly address some concerns head-on.
Our professor speaks again and again of how the US invasion of Iraq went against international law and was simply wrong. (He actually lumps the recent intervention into Libya in this category as well, but that's another matter.) Listen – I do not support Iraq!! And I never voted for Bush! Heck, by now, most of America does not support our involvement there. But at least we're willing to own our mistakes, debate about it openly, and try and improve the future. A lack of willingness to do so would only serve to further disintegrate trust. What our dear professor does not seem to understand is that you can't move forward if you're focused on denying the past.
Background Notes:
*Here's a bit of a backgrounder on the Khodorkovsky case: Former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the founder and primary shareholder of oil firm Yukos, was once reportedly the richest man in Russia . It seems that he wrongly assumed his influence would give him immunity and therefore felt secure in making plans that ran counter to the Kremlin’s interests. Bad call on his part. In 2003, FSB agents stormed his private jet and arrested the oligarch on charges of tax evasion. (I'd consider this an atypical way of handling white collar crime.) The Russian state charged Yukos with absurdly high levels of taxes, impossibly the actual amount owed. The amount the Russian government required for 2003 taxes came to 111% of the firm’s entire revenue that year. By comparison, Gazprom paid less than 15% of its revenue to the state. After years of trials, Khodorkovsky remains in jail while the pieces of Yukos were sold off one-by-one; almost all were sold either directly or indirectly to government-controlled Rosneft and Gazprom.
Somewhat ironically considering the charges, Khodorkovsky had begun changing the firm’s business habits for the better around 1998. Yukos reportedly began modernizing its equipment, involving independent directors, and cleaning its accounts. By 2000, the firm paid $1.9 billion worth of taxes, which was more than the entire firm had been worth when it was privatized five years previously. That isn't to say Khordorkovsky is squeaky clean – after all, you don't become an oligarch in Russia by playing nice. But it does mean that perhaps professors speaking to Western audiences may not want to use this case as a shining example of the Russian legal system. (If you're interested in more details, check out The New Cold War by Edward Lucas, where all these other details here are coming from too.)
**Czech leader Dubcek introduced a program of “socialism with a human” face into Czechoslovakia in the 1960s, during which he limited censorship and introduced the democratization of the country's Communist Party. It's important to note that he was never anti-Soviet; he just wanted changes within the current system. However, in response, the USSR sent troops in 1968 to occupy the country and change the government.
***The “Orange Revolution” brought pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko to power in 2005 over Russian-backed Viktor Yanukovych. Following Yushchenko’s inauguration as president, Gazprom began demanding a more than fourfold increase in the price of natural gas supplies to Ukraine. When Ukraine refused to pay up, Russia shut off the supply of natural gas to Ukraine and, by extension, Western Europe. Russia would repeat this scene again in 2008 following a bold letter by the government affirming Ukraine’s desire to embark upon NATO’s Membership Action Plan. As mentioned, Russia did also have genuine economic considerations. Thanks to a price system left over from the Cold War era, Ukrainian consumers were only paying 10-40% of international natural gas prices. At the same time, Gazprom was asking for $418 per 1,000 cubic meters – a price higher than that paid even by Germany, Gazprom’s largest consumer. (Stats Source: Europe’s Very Cold War: Russia Cuts Gas to Ukraine by Kylie Atwell)
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